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THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR STANDARDIZATION: PRIVATE 
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS AS  
SWORDS AND SHIELDS 
David A. Wirth* 
Abstract: Private voluntary standards such as the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization’s (ISO’s) 14000 series have played an increas-
ingly important role in encouraging corporations to adopt more sustain-
able business models on their own initiative and not in direct response to 
governmentally mandated requirements. ISO standards have a number of 
benefits, including promoting international uniformity; elevating envi-
ronmental issues within an enterprise; promoting international trade; 
and providing a minimal level of environmental performance in coun-
tries with less than adequate regulatory infrastructure. Concerns about 
ISO standards include the relationship to public regulation; and ISO 
14001’s essentially procedural, as opposed to performance-based, charac-
ter. International trade agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade inject ISO standards into the public 
policy arena. Because of the structure of these agreements, ISO standards 
may operate either as a sword—a negative standard used to challenge a 
domestic regulatory action—or a shield—an internationally agreed refer-
ence point that bolsters the legitimacy of a national measure. This Essay 
examines the potential for ISO standards on eco-labeling to act as swords 
to attack domestic requirements, and those on life cycle analysis to serve 
as shields to insulate municipal actions from international challenge in 
areas such as climate protection. 
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Introduction 
 Corporations may choose to “go green” for any number of rea-
sons, and in any number of ways. Customers or consumers through the 
marketplace may signal a demand for environmentally friendly goods 
or services. Alternatively, businesses may consciously choose to cultivate 
an environmentally responsible image. Concern among the public in 
the neighborhood of a manufacturing plant may create pressure for 
greener policies. Firms may retool manufacturing processes in response 
to demands from workers exposed to hazardous materials. Investments 
in energy efficiency or reductions in the use of toxic substances may 
result in significant cost savings, benefiting the firm’s bottom line. Gov-
ernment regulation, the possibility of enforcement, or potential tort 
liability may also act as incentive-creating mechanisms. Other drivers 
include the cultivation of environmentally responsible consumer mar-
kets and price premiums for environmentally friendly products. 
 Considerations such as these among a wide variety of firms and in-
dustries have led to coordinated approaches to addressing environ-
mental concerns in the form of private voluntary standards. This Essay 
discusses one example of these efforts—environmental undertakings in 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). After describ-
ing the structure and operation of ISO, the Essay evaluates both the 
benefits and limitations of ISO standards in the field of the environ-
ment. The utility of, and concerns about, ISO standards are particularly 
pronounced in international trade agreements such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) suite of agreements. Because of the structure of 
these agreements, ISO standards may operate either as a sword—a nega-
tive standard used to challenge a domestic regulatory action—or a 
shield—an internationally agreed reference point that bolsters the le-
gitimacy of a national measure. The Essay examines the potential for 
ISO standards on eco-labeling to act as swords to attack domestic re-
quirements, and those on life cycle analysis to serve as shields to insulate 
municipal actions from international challenge in areas such as climate 
protection. 
I. ISO’s Environmental Standards 
 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), created 
immediately after World War II with headquarters in Geneva, is an in-
ternational federation of standardizing bodies from 157 countries.1 ISO 
                                                                                                                      
1 See About ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
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is not an intergovernmental organization, such as the United Nations, 
constituted by multilateral agreement whose members are states repre-
sented by governmental authorities.2 Although the ISO member from 
some countries is a governmental entity such as a national standardiz-
ing body, ISO is primarily a forum for coordinating standardizing ef-
forts by private business.3 The U.S. member of ISO is the American Na-
tional Standards Institute (ANSI), a private entity. 4  For the United 
States, the primary, although not sole, participants in ISO processes are 
representatives of private industry.5 
 ISO’s principal work product consists of voluntary standards adopted 
by consensus.6 In contrast to some of the output of intergovernmental 
organizations, ISO standards are strictly hortatory and are not binding 
under international law.7 At least so far as the United States is con-
cerned, ISO standards are both adopted by and addressed to private 
parties. Although ISO standards are voluntary, they often have consid-
erable influence. Probably the best-known ISO standards are those 
adopted for film speeds. As a result of harmonization through ISO, film 
with standardized speeds of 100, 200, or 400, is compatible with virtually 
all cameras of whatever brand are available throughout the world. 
 In the mid-1990s, ISO’s Technical Committee (TC) 207 on environ-
mental management began to issue its 14000 series of environmental 
management standards, a process which is still ongoing.8 The center-
                                                                                                                      
2 The principal treatment of the ISO’s environmental activities in a treatise is Ira R. 
Feldman & Douglas Weinfield, Environmental Management Systems, in 1 Environmental 
Law Practice Guide: State and Federal Law § 6A (Michael Gerrard ed., 2008). 
3 Id. § 6A.01[2][a]. 
4See ANSI: Historical Overview, http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history. 
aspx?menuid=1 (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
5 See Feldman & Weinfield, supra note 2, § 6A.01[2][a]. 
6 The process for adopting ISO standards involves a complex procedure of drafts and 
commenting. “Consensus” is defined as “[g]eneral agreement, characterized by the absence 
of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests 
and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned 
and to reconcile any conflicting arguments,” qualified by a note observing that “[c]onsensus 
need not imply unanimity.” See Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations Used in ISO/TC Busi-
ness Plans, http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink.exe/fetch/2000/2122/687806/Glossary.htm? 
nodeid=2778927&vernum=0 (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter ISO Glossary]. Publica-
tion of an ISO standard requires approval by seventy-five percent of the members casting a 
vote. Int’l Org. for Standardization [ISO], Environmental Management Systems—Requirements 
with Guidance for Use, at iv, ISO 14001 (Nov. 15, 2004) (ISO 14000 Environmental Management 
CD-ROM, 2007). 
7 See Feldman & Weinfield, supra note 2, § 6A.01[3][a]. 
8 See ISO, About ISO/TC207, http://www.tc207.org/About207.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 
2009). See generally The ISO 14000 Handbook ( Joseph Cascio ed., 1996); Tom Tibor with 
Ira Feldman, ISO 14000: A Guide to the New Environmental Management Stan-
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piece of the program is ISO 14001 on environmental management sys-
tems (EMS). Unlike product standards such as film speeds, EMS is a 
process-oriented approach designed to help an organization “to develop 
and implement its environmental policy and manage its environmental 
aspects,” including “organizational structure, planning activities, respon-
sibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources.”9 Also included 
in the 14000 series are standards for environmental assessments,10 prod-
uct labeling and declarations, 11 life cycle assessment, 12  environmental 
communication,13 and greenhouse gas emission reporting.14 
 Although the standard is intended to have societal benefits as 
well, the principal purpose of ISO 14001 is to assist businesses in de-
veloping and implementing their own environmental policies and 
programs. Apart from its voluntary character, the standard is strictly 
                                                                                                                      
dards (1996); Christopher L. Bell, ISO 14001: Application of International Environmental 
Management Systems Standards in the United States, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,678 (1995); David 
W. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior Through Environmental Management Systems, 31 Wm. & 
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 75 (2008); Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Envi-
ronmental Management Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 Am 
Bus. L.J. 237 (2000). 
9Environmental Management Systems—Requirements with Guidance for Use, supra note 6, 
§ 3.8 & n.2; see also ISO, Environmental Management Systems—General Guidelines on Principles, 
Systems and Support Techniques, ISO 14004 (Nov. 15, 2004). 
10 See ISO, Environmental Management—Environmental Assessment of Sites and Organiza-
tions (EASO), ISO 14015 (Nov. 15, 2001). 
11 See ISO, Environmental Labels and Declarations—General Principles, ISO 14020 (Sept. 15, 
2000); ISO, Environmental Labels and Declarations—Self-Declared Environmental Claims (Type II 
Environmental Labelling), ISO 14021 (Sept. 15, 1999); ISO, Environmental Labels and Declara-
tions—Type I Environmental Labelling—Principles and Procedures, ISO 14024 (Apr. 1, 1999); 
ISO, Environmental Labels and Declarations—Type III Environmental Declarations—Principles 
and Procedures, ISO 14025 ( July 1, 2006). 
12 See ISO, Environmental Management—Life Cycle Assessment—Principles and Framework, ISO 
14040 ( July 1, 2006); ISO, Environmental Management—Life Cycle Assessment—Requirements and 
Guidelines, ISO 14044 ( July 1, 2006); see also ISO, Environmental Management—Life Cycle Impact 
Assessment—Examples of Application of ISO 14042, ISO/TR 14047 (Oct. 1, 2003); ISO, Environ-
mental Management—Life Cycle Assessment—Data Documentation Format, ISO/TS 14048 (Apr. 1, 
2002); ISO, Environmental Management—Life Cycle Assessment—Examples of Application of ISO 
14041 to Goal and Scope Definition and Inventory Analysis, ISO/TR 14049 (Mar. 15, 2000). 
13  See ISO, Environmental Management—Environmental Communication—Guidelines and 
Examples, ISO 14063 (Aug. 1, 2006). 
14 ISO, Greenhouse Gases—Part 1: Specification with Guidance at the Organization Level for 
Quantification and Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals, ISO 14064-1 (Mar. 1, 
2006); ISO, Greenhouse Gases—Part 2: Specification with Guidance at the Project Level for Quanti-
fication, Monitoring and Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions or Removal Enhance-
ments, ISO 14064-2 (Mar. 1, 2006); ISO, Greenhouse Gases—Part 3: Specification with Guidance 
for the Validation and Verification of Greenhouse Gas Assertions, ISO 14064-3 (Mar. 1, 2006); 
ISO, Greenhouse Gases—Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Validation and Verification Bodies for Use 
in Accreditation or Other Forms of Recognition, ISO 14065 (Apr. 15, 2007). 
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procedural in nature and does not specify particular outcomes. The 
program also includes a private third-party auditing and certification 
scheme to verify compliance and implementation.15 The ISO 14000 
series of standards is consequently fundamentally different in kind 
from mandatory governmentally adopted requirements such as efflu-
ent limitations adopted under the Clean Water Act. 
 In 2008, just over ten years after the issuance of ISO 14001, a proc-
ess for reviewing and revising that standard has now begun.16 TC 207 is 
also at work on a new draft standard, ISO 14005, on the phased imple-
mentation of EMSs and the use of environmental performance evalua-
tions.17 Environmentally related efforts are also taking place in other 
technical committees besides TC 207.18 As of this writing, for instance, 
there has been some activity underway in ISO with respect to liquid 
biofuels undertaken by TC 28 on petroleum products and lubricants, 
which recently created a new subcommittee to work on this topic.19 ISO 
is currently working on a new standard 26000 addressing social respon-
sibility, which also has an environmental component. 
II. Benefits of ISO’s Environmental Standards 
 ISO standards, including the 14000 series, potentially have a global 
reach. A large proportion of the countries on the planet participate in 
ISO activities, and ISO standards have a high profile within multina-
tional corporations. A number of beneficial consequences flow from 
these attributes. 
                                                                                                                      
15 See ISO, Guidelines for Quality and/or Environmental Management Systems Auditing, ISO 
19011 (Oct. 1, 2002). These principles for auditing also apply to the ISO 9000 series of 
standards on quality management systems (QMS). Feldman & Weinfield, supra note 2, 
§ 6A.01[2][a]. The ISO 9000 series is similar in structure to ISO 14001 and served as a 
model for the subsequent development of ISO’s environmental standards. Id. Of the ISO 
14000 series of standards, only 14001 on environmental management systems is subject to 
a certification process. Id. 
16 See ISO, Technical Comm. 207 on Envtl. Mgmt., Communiqué: 14th Annual Meeting of 
ISO Technical Committee 207 on Environmental Management, ISO TC207 N840 ( June 29, 2007), 
available at http://www.tc207.org/pdf/n840isotc207meeting14communiquebeijing .pdf. 
17 See Susan L.K. Briggs, ISO 14000 Hits 10-Year Mark, Quality Progress, Aug. 2007, at 
67, 67–68 (identifying need to address applicability of ISO 14001 to small- and mid-sized 
organizations; credibility of certificates; and compatibility with other management systems). 
18 Id. at 68. 
19 ISO, Technical Comm. 28, Results on the Proposal to Establish a New ISO/TC 28 Sub-
committee on Liquid Biofuels, ISO/TC 28 N 2328 (Oct. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Results on the 
Proposal to Establish a New ISO/TC 28 Subcommittee on Liquid Biofuels], available at http:// 
committees.api.org/standards/isotc28/ndocs/07docs/28n2328.pdf. 
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 One salient feature of ISO 14001, often cited, is the effect of ele-
vating environmental issues within an enterprise. Because an EMS is 
addressed to the entirety of the production process, at least in princi-
ple the exercise of preparing and adopting an EMS engages the entire 
corporation, including top management. 
 Although EMS is a process-oriented approach that in principle is 
distinct from substantive, governmentally established regulatory re-
quirements, the two are quite obviously interrelated. That is, an ISO-
conforming EMS ought to assist a firm in meeting performance-based 
standards such as emissions limitations promulgated under the major 
environmental regulatory statutes. Among other benefits of ISO 14001 
are “[r]educed environmental footprint in terms of environmental 
emissions, discharges and waste; [i]mproved internal communications 
and external partnerships; [and] [c]ontinual system improvements re-
sulting from EMS objectives, targets, programs, periodic audits and 
management reviews.”20 
 ISO standards set out uniform expectations from one country to 
another. To that extent, the meaning of an ISO-conforming environ-
mental management system is similar or identical regardless of loca-
tion. A corollary benefit of uniformity that is frequently identified is 
the salutary effect on international trade. Although this attribute is 
not necessarily immediately obvious in the case of ISO 14001, which 
adopts a process-oriented approach, 21  other standards in the ISO 
14000 series demonstrate the utility of homogeneity. One of the moti-
vations for standards on environmental labeling, for instance, is to 
assure consistency for environmental claims and to assure that envi-
ronmental labels do not operate as disguised barriers to trade.22 ISO 
standards on reporting greenhouse gas emissions or removals are de-
signed to assure consistency in metrics from one country to another 
so as to facilitate comparability of data.23 
 Although perhaps easily overlooked from a U.S. perspective, ISO 
standards are also effective in elevating environmental protection to an 
international plane. Although voluntary and adopted primarily by in-
                                                                                                                      
20 Briggs, supra note 17, at 67. 
21 See ISO 14001, supra note 6, Introduction. 
22 See ISO 14020, supra note 11, § 4.3.1 (“Procedures and requirements for environ-
mental labels and declarations shall not be prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to, or 
with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”). 
23 See ISO 14064–1, supra note 14, § 0.2 (“ISO 14064 is expected to benefit organiza-
tions, governments, project proponents and stakeholders worldwide by providing clarity 
and consistency for quantifying, monitoring, reporting and validating or verifying [green-
house gas] inventories or projects.”). 
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dustry representatives for the benefit of industry, ISO standards none-
theless are, indeed, standards. If nothing else, the mere existence of 
ISO standards on the environment signals that this subject matter is an 
issue of transnational importance. The process of developing ISO stan-
dards, moreover, encourages an international dialogue that also helps 
to lift the topics addressed by the standards above the domestic level. 
 Some governments, particularly those of developing countries, 
may have limited or inadequate regulatory infrastructure. In such a 
setting, ISO standards can create a template for national laws and 
regulations. Because they are addressed directly to private parties, in-
cluding multinational corporations, ISO standards in such a setting 
can also operate as something of a default safety net. In situations 
where governments may be less than effective in assuring environ-
mental quality, ISO requirements may serve literally as a standard for 
governments and the public to hold private entities accountable. 
 One of the principal features of ISO 14001 is the availability of 
third-party certification. Although firms may utilize ISO standards 
without seeking certification, which like the standards themselves is 
voluntary, the availability of third-party certification is an additional fac-
tor that tends to encourage consistency. There may be additional bene-
fits to certification in the form of market share and institutional reputa-
tion. Some customers may demand ISO 14000 certification from their 
suppliers. 
 ISO 14001 consequently is written so as to be “auditable” or veri-
fiable. The third-party certification scheme is designed to increase 
public confidence in corporate accountability. In principle, if a cor-
poration is ISO 14001 certified, then consumers and the public can 
have a certain level of confidence in purchasing goods or services 
from it. Certification is also a way to promote positive relationships 
with local communities, which may be concerned about the environ-
mental performance of a nearby facility. Moreover, the prospect of 
certification creates incentives for industry to adopt environmental 
management systems. More than 21,000 entities in North America 
have now received certification under ISO 14001.24 
 It is also possible for entities to self-declare or self-certify. The 
number of facilities that are implementing ISO 14001, as an indicator 
of the reach of the Standard, is consequently likely higher than the 
number of certifications. Although the obvious value of third-party cer-
tification is credibility, the Standard itself anticipates that this is not 
                                                                                                                      
24 Briggs, supra note 17, at 67. 
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necessary to obtain the benefits of ISO 14001.25 For instance, local gov-
ernments or utilities may wish to improve their environmental per-
formance by making use of ISO standards, but may feel that other 
forms of political accountability render certification redundant or un-
necessary. 
 In the United States, ISO 14001 has had particular utility in the 
public sector, where it has served as a basis for the adoption of EMSs 
for public buildings and undertakings. The Clinton administration 
promulgated an executive order which specifically required the im-
plementation of EMSs by federal agencies and facilities by the end of 
2005.26 While not mentioning ISO 14001 by name, the ISO Standard 
has been the typical model for implementation of the Executive Or-
der, an important instrument for reducing the federal government’s 
environmental footprint. Governmental entities at the state and local 
level have also successfully employed EMSs, including those that con-
form to ISO 14001.27 
III. Concerns About ISO’s Environmental Standards 
 In utilizing and evaluating ISO standards such as the 14000 series, 
one must be aware of their origins. ISO is an international consortium 
of national standardizing bodies, and the ISO process involves har-
monization of potentially disparate national standards. ISO standards 
                                                                                                                      
25 See ISO 14001, supra note 6, § 1 (The Standard is “applicable to any organization that 
wishes to . . . demonstrate conformity with this International Standard by . . . making a self-
determination and self-declaration . . . .”). ISO 14031 provides guidance intended to im-
prove the efficacy of EMSs, but “is not intended for use as a specification standard for certifi-
cation or registration purposes or for the establishment of any other environmental man-
agement system conformance requirements.” ISO, Environmental Management—Environmental 
Performance Evaluation—Guidelines, ISO 14031, § 1 (Nov. 15, 1999). Rather, ISO 14031 “would 
appear to offer a cost effective methodology through which organizations can add real, tan-
gible value, by focusing on critical areas of environmental performance.” José Flávio Guerra 
Machado Coelho, Sustainability Performance Evaluation: Management Systems Model for 
Individual Organizations and Supply Chains 40 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cen-
tral Queensland University) (on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Re-
view), available at http://library-resources.cqu.edu.au/thesis/adt-QCQU/uploads/approved/ 
adt-QCQU20060720.094327 /public/02whole.pdf. 
26 Exec. Order No. 13,148, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,595, 24,597–98 (Apr. 21, 2000). This Execu-
tive Order has been superseded by Exec. Order 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919, 3920 ( Jan. 24, 
2007), which also requires EMSs for federal agencies and facilities. See generally Ann Rho-
des, Note, ISO Enters the Public Sector Through the United States Forest Service, 18 Colo. J. Int’l 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 417 (2007). 
27 See, e.g., ISO 14001 in Pennsylvania: EMS for Local Government, http://www.dep.state. 
pa.us/dep/deputate/pollprev/iso14001/emslgo.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (state pro-
gram supporting implementation of ISO 14001-like EMSs in local municipalities). 
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are voluntary and addressed directly to private parties—largely indus-
try—and are adopted by a process that involves national delegations 
composed almost exclusively of industry representatives. 
 Although environmental organizations and academics have been 
invited to participate in the ISO process in the United States, it would 
be difficult to say that ISO as a forum reflects a balanced representation 
of stakeholders on environmental issues; the prevailing tone is still very 
much industry-oriented. Because of the voluntary nature of ISO stan-
dards, the perception of industry domination of the forum, the lengthy 
and complicated process for adoption of ISO standards, and the ex-
pense of attending frequent overseas meetings, few American non-
profit environmental organizations have made a significant commit-
ment to the ISO process. 
 Moreover, ISO standards are adopted by consensus, which is very 
carefully defined in the ISO universe.28 Although there are different 
tests at different stages of the process, “consensus” generally means 
widespread acceptance after lengthy consultation. It is therefore unlikely 
that ISO standards will serve as a dynamic driver of improvements in 
environmental quality. To the contrary, concern about the potential for 
the ISO process to produce modest, least-common-denom-inator out-
puts is frequently expressed. 
A. Relationship to Public Regulation in the United States 
 To the extent that ISO processes are directed at selecting among 
essentially arbitrary choices of little societal impact but of great practi-
cal utility to industry, such as standardizing film speeds, the Organiza-
tion’s institutional structure has been of little concern from the point 
of view of public policy. The specifications chosen for film speeds do 
not really matter so long as they are compatible with all cameras 
around the world. But by moving into the field of environment, the 
ISO 14000 standards have entered an arena of public policy which, in 
the United States and many other countries, is already governed by a 
complex web of governmentally mandated standards. This feature is 
not necessarily undesirable from a normative point of view, but it sug-
gests that the relationship between ISO standards and governmental 
regulatory requirements is, at least potentially, a delicate one. 
 One relatively obvious distinction is that ISO standards are respon-
sive to a different constituency than is public regulation. Where envi-
                                                                                                                      
28 See ISO Glossary, supra note 6. 
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ronmental statutory and regulatory requirements, at least in principle, 
have an aura of democratic legitimacy, the principal audience for ISO 
standards can be expected to be motivated primarily by market-driven 
factors, such as profitability. The consensus requirement creates addi-
tional reservations about the potential for downward inertia originating 
from literally around the globe. In such a setting, objections to exces-
sive stringency can be expected to dominate by comparison with initia-
tives that might push for greater rigor. The voluntary nature of ISO 
standards renders them fundamentally different in kind from most 
governmentally established environmental requirements. Last, unlike 
public enforcement processes, the principal means of implementation 
is through a private third-party auditing process, also voluntary in na-
ture. 
 These sorts of concerns have led to an equivocal relationship be-
tween private voluntary processes and federal regulators in the United 
States. On the one hand, there is potentially some synergy between 
ISO standards and the goals of public regulation. An ISO-conforming 
EMS may help a firm meet regulatory requirements, and the third-
party auditing process may identify compliance problems at an early 
stage. Participation of regulatory officials in the normative phase of 
these voluntary undertakings can be beneficial, and, on occasion, pri-
vate voluntary standards may be appropriate alternatives to manda-
tory, governmental regulation. For example, a voluntary consensus 
standard may generate better data than the regulatory process, may 
be an efficacious vehicle for educating regulatory officials as to the 
practical needs of industry, and, if effective, may obviate the need for 
regulatory intervention altogether. 29 For these reasons, a variety of 
federal authorities encourage federal officials to participate in the 
                                                                                                                      
29 For example, EMSs have been used as a component of injunctive relief in civil en-
forcement settlements. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Action Plan for Promoting the 
Use of Environmental Management Systems (EMS) (2001), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/ems/position/action.htm (follow “Goal 3” hyperlink). EMSs are referenced in 
EPA’s audit and self-disclosure policy. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, 
Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,621 (Apr. 11, 2000). 
EMSs have featured prominently in a variety of EPA corporate excellence programs, the 
current version of which is the National Environmental Performance Track. See Descrip-
tion of Program Changes for the National Environmental Performance Track, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 27,922, 27,923 (May 17, 2004); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Environ-
mental Performance Track Program Guide 1 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
performancetrack/downloads/PT2008_guide_v7.pdf. See generally Position Statement on 
Environmental Management Systems (EMSs), 71 Fed. Reg. 5664 (Feb. 2, 2006). 
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process of drafting, and to make use of the work product from, volun-
tary standard-setting efforts.30 
 On the other hand, it is equally clear that federal agencies must 
in all cases abide by the statutory standards that govern the agencies’ 
activities. Whatever their policy merits, ISO standards domestically are 
private, voluntary undertakings. Consequently, federal agencies may 
use governmental standards adopted by a non-governmental entity, 
like ISO, regardless of the respect accorded such a body, only as hor-
tatory guidance which must be reevaluated by reference to appropri-
ate statutory standards. 31  This result is self-evident, as ISO, whose 
members are representatives of affected industries, does not necessar-
ily represent the public interest more broadly. Indeed, it is not diffi-
cult to imagine a setting in which the array of interests that shape an 
industry-dominated, voluntary standard-setting process is expressly 
contrary to the well-being of the public in the United States and 
abroad. Even so, there is frequently a residual concern about a poten-
tially hidden agenda to substitute ISO standards for federal regula-
tion. Presumably for reasons such as these, federal officials tend to 
play a deferential role, and U.S. governmental input tends to be of 
limited importance in the process.32 
                                                                                                                      
30 See e.g., National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-113, § 12(d)(1)–(2), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (1996) (specifying that “all Federal agencies 
and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary 
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy 
objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments” and that “Federal 
agencies and departments shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards 
bodies and shall . . . participate with such bodies in the development of technical stan-
dards”); OMB Circular No. A-119; Federal Participation in the Development and Use of 
Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546 
(Feb. 19, 1998). Section 6 of the Circular specifies that “[a]ll federal agencies must use 
voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards in their procure-
ment and regulatory activities, except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impracti-
cal.” Id. at 8554. Section 7 states that “[a]gencies must consult with voluntary consensus 
standards bodies, both domestic and international, and must participate with such bodies 
in the development of voluntary consensus standards when consultation and participation 
is in the public interest and is compatible with their missions, authorities, priorities, and 
budget resources.” Id. at 8555–56. 
31 See, e.g., OMB Circular No. A-119; Federal Participation in the Development and Use 
of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. at 
8555 (“This policy does not preempt or restrict agencies’ authorities and responsibilities to 
make regulatory decisions authorized by statute. Such regulatory authorities and responsi-
bilities include determining the level of acceptable risk; setting the level of protection; and 
balancing risk, cost, and availability of technology in establishing regulatory standards.”). 
32 At least some knowledgeable observers feel that governmental entities, such as the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, should play a more active role in ANSI 
and, through it, ISO, at least with respect to standard-setting activities like the ISO 14000 
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B. Procedural Character and Substantive Limitations 
 ISO 14001, unlike a product standard such as film speed, is fun-
damentally procedural in nature. With the benefit of hindsight, it is 
perhaps easy to see why this is so. The process of drafting ISO 14001 
involved the reconciliation of competing approaches, including in par-
ticular the European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS),33 
some of which continue to exist as alternatives or supplements to ISO 
14001. To that extent, the utility to industry may be maximized and the 
overlap with regulatory requirements adopted through governmental 
processes reduced. In particular, an ISO 14001-conforming EMS is de-
signed to help a company achieve its own environmental goals through 
an iterative process of “continual improvement.”34 
 Even so, ISO 14001 has been criticized for its failure to engage 
with substantive regulatory requirements. Consistent with ISO 14001’s 
systems—as opposed to a substantive approach—a company may re-
ceive ISO 14001 certification even with outstanding regulatory viola-
tions.35 Not surprisingly, this attribute of the ISO standards has been 
the subject of serious criticism.36 The public, being unfamiliar with 
the nuances of the standard and the meaning of ISO certification, 
may very well be misled into thinking that certification is an indica-
tion of superior substantive environmental performance. 
 Another attribute of ISO 14001 that has been the subject of con-
siderable criticism is the lack of transparency in the process. As they 
are under development, ISO standards are generally not publicly 
available. Even the standards themselves are copyrighted and proprie-
tary, and at least in principle must be purchased for use.37 
                                                                                                                      
series that have public policy implications. Telephone Interview with Ira R. Feldman, 
President and Senior Counsel, Greentrack Strategies (Feb. 8, 2008). 
33 See Council Regulation 761/2001, Allowing Voluntary Participation by Organisations 
in a Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), 2001 O.J. (L 114) 1 (EC). See 
generally EMAS: The Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/emas/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
34 ISO 14001, supra note 6, § 3.2 (defining “continual improvement” as a “recurring 
process of enhancing the environmental management system in order to achieve im-
provements in overall environmental performance consistent with the organization’s envi-
ronmental policy”). 
35 See, e.g., Feldman & Weinfield, supra note 2, § 6A.04[2]. 
36 E.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organization 
for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 Ecology L.Q. 
479, 534–38 (1995). 
37 Int’l Org. for Standardization & Int’l Electrotechnical Comm’n, Copy-
right, Standards and the Internet, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/copyright_ 
information_brochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
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 The process of preparing an ISO 14001-conforming EMS does not 
necessarily involve any public participation, and the standard specifies 
little if any provision of environmentally related information to the 
public.38 ISO 14001 calls for an enterprise to make its generic environ-
mental policy available to the public.39 As to the EMS itself, “[t]he or-
ganization shall decide whether to communicate externally about its 
significant environmental aspects.”40 Otherwise, the only requirement 
is to “establish, implement and maintain a procedure(s) for . . . receiv-
ing, documenting and responding to relevant communication from 
external interested parties,”41 presumably including the public.42 
 ISO certification is also somewhat less effective than might ap-
pear at first blush. The ISO 14001 auditing and certification process is 
similar in concept to a financial audit. As demonstrated by recent 
public accounting scandals, there may be good cause for concern 
about the existence of a multiplicity of auditing and certifying entities 
competing with each other for business.43 The disclosure of substan-
tive regulatory violations that might be identified during an audit is a 
particularly sensitive issue. Such a situation can trigger a race-to-the-
bottom dynamic, in which companies seeking certification may en-
gage in “forum shopping” by choosing registrars (certifying bodies or 
                                                                                                                      
38 See generally ISO 14063, supra note 13. ISO 14063 addresses the transmittal of envi-
ronmentally related information, including to the public. Id. at § 1. That standard, how-
ever, contains no substantive minimum standard for transparency, but instead describes 
good practice standards for environmental communication policies and approaches if an 
entity chooses to undertake such activities. See generally id. 
39 ISO 14001, supra note 6, § 4.2(g). 
40 Id. § 4.4.3. 
41 Id. § 4.4.3, 4.4.3(b). 
42 But see supra note 38 and accompanying text (ISO 14063 specifies form of, but not 
need for, environmental communication). 
43 In the United States, registrars are accredited to award ISO 14001 certification by the 
American National Standards Institute-American Society for Quality (ANSI-ASQ) National 
Accreditation Board (formerly the American National Standards Institute-Registrar Accredi-
tation Board National Accreditation Program (ANSI-RAB NAP)). See ANAB, http://www. 
anab.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). As of this writing, the ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation 
Board has accredited about 25 registrars to perform ISO 14001 audits. Id. (follow “Directory” 
hyperlink; then search for standard “ISO 14001”). Some of those companies are headquar-
tered abroad in countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Mexico, Korea and China. 
Id. The potential for registrars (certification bodies or auditors) to be accredited by counter-
parts of the ANSI-RAB NAP in foreign countries in turn can trigger “forum shopping” at the 
next rung up the institutional ladder. Id. (follow “MCAA” hyperlink). 
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auditors) that are perceived as likely to apply less rather than more 
rigorous approaches to the certification process.44 
 The certification process itself may give little reason for confi-
dence, at least to third parties who might rely upon it as an indication 
of quality control. To facilitate external evaluation, the standards them-
selves must be “auditable” —meaning capable of unbiased verifica-
tion.45 While ostensibly facilitating objectivity, this feature can encour-
age a kind of checklist approach to the audit process based on items 
whose presence or absence can be impartially confirmed in a binary 
on/off mode.46 In the evaluation of training courses provided by regis-
trars to auditors, for instance, this may translate into factors such as 
whether the instructor spent the required minimum amount of time 
with students.47 Consistent with the basic approach, qualitative criteria 
such as teaching effectiveness are not taken into account. The emphasis 
in the certification process consequently tends to be on rote satisfaction 
of objectively verifiable requirements rather than on exceeding or sur-
passing minimum standards. 
IV. Swords, Shields, and Trade Agreements 
 The motivation for the adoption of ISO standards, even those 
within the 14000 series, may be quite diverse. The newly released ISO 
standards on greenhouse gases do not require any particular substan-
tive performance requirements. Instead, these standards address pri-
marily the integrity of data reporting. Consequently, they would appear 
to be of limited application, primarily in settings such as the calculation 
of offsets and trading of emissions rights where a standard format for 
collecting and reporting data is required. 
 ISO standards on eco-labeling, by contrast, appear to have been 
motivated by a concern to rein in or discipline a proliferation of diver-
                                                                                                                      
44 See Briggs, supra note 17, at 67–68 (noting that “the underlying competitiveness of 
the certification industry can drive auditors to cut audit durations,” and noting pressure 
on auditors to refrain from issuing nonconformances (NCRs)). 
45 See ISO 19011, supra note 15 (“Guidelines for Quality and/or Environmental Man-
agement Systems Auditing.”). 
46 See Briggs, supra note 17, at 67 (“[U]sers want verification that an EMS results in im-
proved performance, not just conformance to requirements during a certification audit. 
Because there is inconsistency in results, users are questioning the value of accredited 
certification.”). 
47 See generally Registrar Accreditation Bd. and Quality Soc’y of Australasia 
Int’l (RABSQA), Training Course Certification: Training Provider Administration 
Requirements (2007), available at http://www.rabqsa.com/docs/downloads /TCD62.pdf 
(standards for certifying training providers). 
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gent approaches, which among other things could operate as trade 
barriers. While the biofuels initiative in TC 28 is at an early stage of de-
velopment and little information is publicly available, the likely scope 
will include harmonization of standards and test methods.48 This effort 
appears to have been commenced in response to a high current level of 
interest in public policy for biofuels and a variety of proposals for pri-
vate voluntary certification and labeling schemes for them. 
 As demonstrated by these latter initiatives, ISO standards may 
well be intended to establish not only a floor, but also a ceiling. That 
is, part of the motivation for their adoption may be to encourage uni-
formity as a response to a proliferation of divergent approaches. From 
this point of view, the concern is that the effect of ISO standards may 
very well operate so as to impede the development of creative new 
approaches to environmental problems. 
A. Transformative Effect of Trade Agreements 
 In the mid-1990s—probably not entirely by chance coinciding with 
the development of the ISO 14000 series—the public policy effect of 
ISO standards received considerable impetus in the form of the adop-
tion of two new international trade agreements: the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),49 and the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Negotiations in GATT,50 which created the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). Chapter Nine of NAFTA addresses “technical barriers to 
trade,” as does a new WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement). 51 A wide variety of regulatory requirements that 
have environmental or public health implications, including specifica-
tions for consumer products and children’s toys, appliance efficiency 
criteria, and vehicle fuel efficiency standards, are potentially covered by 
these requirements.52 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Results on the Proposal to Establish a New ISO/TC 28 Subcommittee on Liquid Biofuels, 
supra note 19. 
49 E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
50 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
51 See NAFTA, supra note 49, ch. 9; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
52 The TBT Agreement applies to all products in international trade and governs a 
“technical regulation,” which is defined as an instrument which “lays down product char-
acteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal 
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 International obligations or “disciplines” on trade are almost ex-
clusively “negative,” in the sense that they establish constraints on 
governmental action. A partial analogy can be found in the Dormant 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 53  which places similar 
limitations on state-level regulation even in the absence of congres-
sional legislation. Trade agreements encourage liberalized or free 
trade through requirements that limit governmental intrusion into 
what otherwise would be a free market. From an environmental point 
of view, this phenomenon is the equivalent of deregulation—in the 
sense of reducing the level of governmental intervention in the mar-
ket in the form of tariffs or other prescriptive requirements—and 
trade agreements by virtue of their negative obligations are inherently 
deregulatory. This momentum largely explains the phenomenon of 
globalization, at least as it has been defined for the past decade or so: 
getting governments out of the business of impeding private interac-
tions and transactions, thereby facilitating their global reach. 
 Environmental protection by contrast anticipates affirmative gov-
ernmental intervention in the marketplace to offset market failures. 
That explains the clash between the two approaches: one operates to 
disable governmental action, while the other depends on invigorating 
government. Obligations in trade agreements proscribe certain gov-
ernmental behaviors that impede trade, while environmental laws pre-
scribe affirmative governmental actions to protect public health and 
ecosystems. In other words, free trade agreements do not contain any 
affirmative obligations to protect the environment or public health; 
rather, they establish constraints on the capacity of member states to 
implement domestic regulatory standards.54 Like most international 
trade agreements, the WTO TBT Agreement is asymmetric, in that it 
contains no minimum standards of performance in the field of envi-
ronment or in most other areas of social and regulatory policy. 
 Consistent with that approach, the WTO TBT Agreement defines 
“standards,” as that term is used in that text, to include voluntary guide-
lines adopted by an “international standardizing body,”55 a term which 
                                                                                                                      
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method.” TBT Agreement, supra note 51, 
Annex 1, ¶ 1 (“Terms and their Definitions for the Purpose of This Agreement.”). 
53 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622–23 (1978) (applying 
Dormant Commerce Clause to interstate trade in waste). 
54 See, e.g., Douglas J. Caldwell & David A. Wirth, Trade and the Environment: Equilibrium 
or Imbalance?, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 563, 586 (1996) (book review). 
55 TBT Agreement, supra note 51, at Annex 1, ¶ 2 (“Terms and Their Definitions for 
the Purpose of This Agreement.”). According to the TBT Agreement, a “standard” is a 
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was expressly intended to include ISO.56 Although standards adopted 
by ISO are non-binding instruments addressed directly to private enti-
ties, the TBT Agreement then goes on to require the utilization of 
“relevant international standards” where they exist in promulgating 
governmentally mandated regulatory requirements. 57  Governmental 
regulations that conform to the standards adopted by such an interna-
tional standardizing body are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 
validity.58 To justify a departure from international standards, presuma-
bly because they are insufficiently rigorous, a WTO member would 
have to demonstrate that a harmonized international standard “would 
be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the le-
gitimate objectives pursued.” 59 The WTO jurisprudence interpreting 
this provision suggests that the threshold for justifying a departure from 
international standards is high.60 
 Thanks to the structure of the TBT Agreement, those national 
regulatory requirements that are not based on the output, when it ex-
ists, of such a body are therefore particularly vulnerable to challenge as 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. And the sorts of govern-
mental requirements that are most likely to create impediments to in-
ternational trade are those that are more rigorous than the interna-
tional requirements, which may well be the product of a least-common-
denominator consensus in an industry-dominated forum. The result is 
that, through a trade agreement, the expectations of what, at least from 
the point of view of the United States, is a private standardizing organi-
                                                                                                                      
[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and 
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related proc-
esses and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It 
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or pro-
duction method. 
Id. 
56 See id. (expressly referencing “the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, Gen-
eral Terms and Their Definitions Concerning Standardization and Related Activities”). 
57 Id. at art. 2.4. 
58 Id. at art. 2.5. 
59 Id. at art 2.4. The analogous passage in NAFTA sets out a similar approach. NAFTA, 
supra note 49, ch. 9, arts. 905 & 915 (defining “standard” as “a document, approved by a 
recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or charac-
teristics . . . with which compliance is not mandatory”). 
60 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, 
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) (requiring application of non-binding standard prom-
ulgated by Codex Alimentarius Commission) [hereinafter EC—Sardines]. 
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zation are transformed into an outer limit of rigor—a ceiling—for pub-
lic regulation to protect health and environment domestically. 
 Initially, the requirements of the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement 
and other trade agreements may appear to be similar to those in the 
United States, such as OMB Circular A-119, which counsel reliance on 
ISO standards to the extent consistent with statutory mandates.61 In 
actuality, however, the two situations are very different. While authoriz-
ing consistency where possible with ISO standards as non-binding advi-
sory guidelines, the OMB Circular, as it must, reasserts the primacy of 
congressionally enacted legislative requirements.62 By contrast, NAFTA 
and the WTO TBT Agreement adopt the private standard as a reference 
point and require public authorities to justify departures, especially 
those tending in the direction of more rigorous requirements, from 
those privately agreed expectations. This situation in effect bootstraps a 
nongovernmental standard into one with binding significance for gov-
ernmentally established regulatory requirements, at least as a matter of 
international law. 
 Departures from the benchmark standard by domestic regulatory 
authorities can then be challenged by foreign governments through 
the trade agreement dispute settlement process, among the more effi-
cacious known in the international legal system.63 In other words, op-
erating through the TBT Agreement, non-binding ISO standards may 
acquire international legal significance, may be transformed from 
minimum standards of performance into regulatory ceilings from 
which governments must justify departure in terms of greater rigor, 
and, at least from the U.S. point of view, may metamorphose from 
strictly private, non-governmental instruments to standards with inter-
national legal significance. 
 On the domestic level, the results of WTO and NAFTA dispute 
settlement processes—the international equivalent of judicial opin-
                                                                                                                      
61 See OMB Circular A–119; Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Vol-
untary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 
8554 (Feb. 19, 1998). 
62 Id. 
63 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra 
note 50, at Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of Uruguay Round (containing the “Un-
derstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”). See generally 
David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade 
Organization: Practice and Procedure (1999) (providing analysis of WTO dispute 
settlement procedures). 
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ions—do not have the force of law.64 They do, however, create serious 
expectations on the international level, and are possibly binding as a 
matter of international law. 65  A finding by an international trade 
agreement dispute settlement panel or the WTO’s Appellate Body 
that the United States is not complying with its international obliga-
tions also engages serious separation of powers considerations, and 
the courts may be reluctant to impede implementation by the Execu-
tive Branch, the “sole organ” of the Nation in foreign affairs.66 The 
back-impact of international trade agreement dispute settlement pro-
ceedings within the United States consequently may be considerable. 
The limited jurisprudence on the subject suggests that, although 
WTO panel and Appellate Body reports do not have the force of law, 
reviewing courts are inclined to give them considerable deference,67 
presumably so as to avoid interference with the Executive’s preroga-
tive in foreign affairs and to avoid the appearance of judicial man-
agement of the foreign relations of the United States. 
B. Eco-Labeling 
 ISO standards for “eco-labeling” illustrate this phenomenon well. 
Eco-labeling schemes, by communicating distinctions in similar prod-
ucts based on relative environmental impact, are designed to inform 
consumers of environmentally preferable product choices. Foreign 
eco-labels have been the subject of criticism from U.S. industry, which 
has asserted in particular that a governmentally sponsored, voluntary 
                                                                                                                      
64 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (2000) (relationship of NAFTA to federal and state law); 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3512 (2000) (relationship of Uruguay Round agreements to federal and state law); cf. 
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1360–61 (2008) (domestic effect of decisions of Interna-
tional Court of Justice). 
65 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 109, 117–23 (2004) (results of 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings binding under international law). But see Judith 
Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 416, 
416–18 (1996) (results of WTO dispute settlement proceedings not binding under inter-
national law, but merely give rise to right to retaliate); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, 
The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 
31 J. Legal Stud. S179, S181 (2002) (WTO dispute settlement system better understood 
as providing for “efficient breach”). 
66 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
67 E.g., George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623–24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ( judicial 
review of reformulated gasoline rule promulgated under Clean Air Act after successful 
WTO challenge and adverse WTO Appellate Body report). See generally Patrick C. Reed, 
Relationship of WTO Obligations to U.S. International Trade Law: Internationalist Vision Meets 
Domestic Reality, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 209 (2006) (analyzing domestic effect of WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings in U.S. court proceedings). 
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program currently implemented by the European Union discrimi-
nates against U.S. exports.68 
 Eco-labeling is a good example of the interaction between interna-
tional trade agreements and private voluntary standards. Operating 
through the WTO TBT Agreement as standards adopted by an interna-
tional standardizing body, eco-labeling criteria published by ISO may 
very well require governments to justify departures from those private, 
hortatory principles adopted primarily by industry. 
 ISO standards govern unilateral environmental claims made by 
manufacturers, known as “type II” labels.69 They also address govern-
mentally or privately established schemes that include a single mark, 
such as the U.S. Government-sponsored, voluntary Energy Star logo for 
identifying energy-efficient personal computers.70 These are known as 
“type I” labels.71 “Type III” labels, also governed by an ISO standard,72 
transmit quantified information in a manner similar to the identifica-
tion of fat, carbohydrates, and protein on nutrition labels in the United 
States.73 During the drafting process that led to the adoption of ISO’s 
eco-labeling standards, there was express concern for constraining or 
“disciplining” the potential abuse of environmental labeling schemes as 
unjustified barriers to international trade. 
 As a consequence, according to ISO standards, eco-labels must be 
“accurate, verifiable, relevant, not misleading,”74 and “based on scien-
tific methodology that is sufficiently thorough and comprehensive to 
support the claim.”75 Those requirements all sound more than reason-
able in the abstract, but each must be understood as a negative disci-
pline. That is, if a label is not “relevant,” then the label violates the stan-
dard and potentially the TBT Agreement as well. These negative tests 
can be adjudicated by international trade agreement dispute settlement 
                                                                                                                      
68 See Council Regulation 1980/2000, Revised Community Eco-label Award Scheme, 2000 
O.J. (L 237) 1 (EC). See generally European Union Eco-label Home Page, http://ec.europa. 
eu/environment/ecolabel/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
69 ISO 14021, supra note 11, § 1. Among the claims potentially covered by this Stan-
dard are self-declared or self-certified conformance to ISO 14001. See supra text accompa-
nying note 25. 
70 See History of Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_his- 
tory (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
71 ISO 14024, supra note 11, § 3.1. 
72 ISO 14025, supra note 11, § 1. 
73 See generally Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs., How to Understand and Use the Nutrition Facts Label 1–3 (2004), 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~acrobat/foodlab.pdf. 
74 ISO 14020, supra note 11, § 4.2.1. 
75 Id. § 4.4.1. 
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bodies.76 When applied to a situation such as precautionary labeling, 
among the least intrusive of regulatory interventions, the situation be-
comes even more complex in areas such as the evaluation of policy-
relevant science that by definition involve a measure of judgment. 
C. Life Cycle Assessment 
 In contrast to the situation with eco-labeling, in which ISO stan-
dards act as a “sword” with which one state may challenge another’s 
domestic regulation, this same structure may act as a “shield” in situa-
tions in which a state chooses to rely on international standards. A 
good example of this latter phenomenon is California’s new Low-
Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS),77 a requirement designed to reduce 
the carbon intensity—carbon emitted per unit of fuel consumed—of 
fuels in California by ten percent by the year 2020.78 
 Similar to the approach employed with automobile fuel efficiency 
requirements on the federal level, the LCFS applies an averaging ap-
proach, which means that each provider must meet the reduction tar-
get as measured against the totality of the fuels it sells on the California 
market (as opposed to, say, in each gallon). The LCFS specifies applica-
tion of a life cycle analysis (LCA) so as to take into account emissions 
not only from combustion, but also production and transport, of fu-
els.79 These factors include emissions associated with extraction, protec-
tion of sensitive lands and ecosystems, and a variety of other emissions 
which, in the case of imported fuels, are physically located in the coun-
try of export.80 
 One of the basic obligations found in international trade agree-
ments is the “national treatment” discipline, specifying non-discrim-
                                                                                                                      
76 E.g. EC—Sardines, supra note 60. See generally Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 63 
(detailing WTO dispute settlement procedures). 
77 California Alternative and Renewable Fuel, Vehicle Technology, Clean Air, and Carbon 
Reduction Act of 2007, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 44270–44274.5 (West Supp. 2008); 
see Cal. Air Resources Bd. & Cal. Energy Comm’n, State Alternative Fuels Plan 78–80 
(2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-600-2007-011/CEC-600- 
2007-011-CMF.PDF. 
78 David Crane & Brian Prusnek, Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., 
The Role of a Low Carbon Fuel Standard in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Protecting our Economy 1 ( Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/gov/ 
alternativeFuels.pdf. 
79 See generally TIAX LLC, Full Fuel Cycle Assessment: Well-to-Wheels Energy In-
puts, Emissions, and Water Impacts (2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007 
publications/CEC-600-2007-004/CEC-600-2007-004-REV.PDF (providing a detailed life cycle 
analysis under various approaches). 
80 Id. at 73–76. 
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inatory treatment of imported products by comparison with their do-
mestically produced counterparts. 81  Similarly, the “most-favored na-
tion” discipline requires states of import to refrain from discriminatory 
treatment among products on the basis of their national origin, as in 
preferential treatment for Mexican oil by comparison with Saudi oil.82 
As demonstrated by a well-known dispute involving the U.S. embargo of 
shrimp harvested in a manner that harms endangered sea turtles,83 so-
called “process and production methods” (PPMs)—which regulate how 
an imported product is produced as opposed to its content—may be 
suspect from a trade point of view. 
 ISO standards for life cycle assessment, like those for eco-labeling, 
are undoubtedly intended to discipline or constrain the potential for 
abuse. At the same time, the ISO methodology for conducting an LCA 
is remarkably malleable. In particular, a life cycle assessment that con-
forms to ISO standards “assesses, in a systematic way, the environmental 
aspects and impacts of product systems, from raw material acquisition 
to final disposal, in accordance with the stated goal and scope.”84 An 
ISO-conforming LCA is characterized by “flexibility,”85 “addresses po-
tential environmental impacts,”86 and includes within its scope the “ac-
quisition of raw materials; . . . distribution/transportation; [and] dis-
posal of process wastes and products.”87 If ISO standards meet Califor-
nia’s regulatory needs, and California chooses to rely upon them in 
performing the LCA called for by the program, then the same WTO 
TBT Agreement that transforms ISO standards for eco-labeling into a 
“sword” could very likely tend to shield California’s Low-Carbon Fuel 
Standard from a trade-based challenge. 
Conclusion 
 By adopting the 14000 series of standards on environmental man-
agement, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has 
decisively moved into a major public policy arena, not just in the 
                                                                                                                      
81  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 3, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 18, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194, as incorporated into Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 50. 
82 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I., supra note 81. 
83 Panel Report, United States—Sections 7.16 of the Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998). 
84 ISO 14040, supra note 12, § 4.3(a). 
85 Id. § 4.3(g). 
86 Id. § 4.3(i). 
87 Id. § 5.2.3. 
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United States but in other countries as well. ISO is an important forum 
for harmonizing private voluntary initiatives from around the world. 
The benefits of laying down international minimum standards through 
ISO are substantial, although there are also significant concerns about 
the potential impacts of non-binding standards of the ISO variety on 
public regulation. 
 Simultaneously with the adoption of ISO’s standards on the envi-
ronment, major new trade agreements that created the World Trade 
Organization and encouraged the liberalization of trade in North 
America also addressed measures such as food safety standards and 
eco-labeling with new international disciplines. By expressly referenc-
ing ISO standards, these international trade agreements have created 
a new category of legal and policy questions. ISO’s private voluntary 
standards can act as ceilings on the rigor of governmentally estab-
lished requirements, as in the case of eco-labeling, which can be used 
as swords by one state to challenge the national measures of another. 
Through the same process, as in the case of life cycle analysis, ISO 
standards may act as a floor, which in turn can shield national meas-
ures from attack by reference to trade-based tests. 
 Private voluntary standards, such as those published by ISO, do 
not necessarily fall neatly into the categories of “swords” or “shields,” 
but, indeed, can simultaneously operate as both. For example, ISO 
standards for life cycle assessment, as they operate through the TBT 
Agreement, are undoubtedly intended to discipline or constrain the 
potential for abuse. To that extent, ISO standards operate as a regula-
tory ceiling, which can be used as “swords” by one state to challenge 
the national measures of another. But they can equally well insulate 
life cycle analyses that conform to international standards from trade-
based challenges emanating from abroad. 
 This phenomenon, not to mention its consequences, is seriously 
underappreciated by many constituencies, including legislators, regu-
lators, agency officials, and the environmental community. As ISO 
quietly proceeds to move forward with yet another series of standards 
on social responsibility, we the public may discover only too late that 
important public policies are affected in a forum that receives little 
public scrutiny, that is largely inaccessible except to the business 
community, and that does not necessarily reflect the public interest. 
There is no doubt but that efforts with significant public policy con-
sequences will continue in ISO, and most likely will expand. What 
those undertakings mean for efforts to promote environmental sus-
tainability is, however, indeterminate. 
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 During the debate over NAFTA, George Will praised an agree-
ment designed to “propel a free society into an exhilaratingly un-
knowable future.” 88 Perhaps nowhere is the effect of international 
trade agreements more “unknowable” than in the effect of interna-
tional, private, voluntary standards on domestic, mandatory, govern-
mentally established regulation. Whether, a decade and a half after 
the entry into force of these agreements, this effect on balance is “ex-
hilarating” or the opposite is still an open question. 
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